Educating The People of Scotland

Scotland's Angels

The most insidious and abhorrent abuse of power by the Scottish Government and their Service Providers:

Destruction of the family unit

Information disclosed in FOISA 2002 request responses identifies that on 6 February 2019 the ICO visited a Police Scotland (The Police Service of Scotland) iVPD/VPD ‘Concern Hub’ in Edinburgh. This 6 February 2019 visit by the ICO would have drawn the same conclusions as the recent Decision 127-2021 from the Scottish Information Commissioner, was a considerable disclosure, namely that the Police Scotland do not keep records of the data controller organisations from whom Police Scotland sources information from prior to further information processing by Police Scotland to all other public sector organisations.


The Scottish Information Commissioner, Decision 092-2019 Samantha Kerr v The Scottish Ministers Independent Scrutiny of Inter-agency discussions states that “the Scottish Ministers noted that IRDs do not of themselves have legal personality. Each agency involved in an IRD has its own compliance and
governance procedures to adhere to.

For example, West Lothian Child Protection Committee (which is not a Scottish public authority for the purposes of FOISA) should have its own guidelines on independent scrutiny and oversight of decision making in IRDs that fall within its remit.

The Ministers submitted that the Scottish Government does not regulate or directly participate in IRDs, but officials working in the area of child protection policy have a detailed understanding of how they operate. The ICO should have identified that both multi-agency risk assessment conference (marac) meetings and inter-agency referral discussion (IRD) meetings, and all Child Protection and multi-agency disciplinary meetings involve the sharing of extremely sensitive which may or may not be accurate and proportionate (i.e. subjective, allegations not proven) data and that Police Scotland and all agencies who are involved in providing public services who should been keeping a tight control over their data protection law compliance.

On 25th Mary 2018 the new Data Protection Act 2018 and GDPR UK superseded the Data Protection Act 1998.

Police Scotland had no Appropriate Policy Document (APD) documentation in place for the information sharing on the portal known as the interim Vulnerable Persons Database (iVPD), a database that merges and collates information from multiple data controller sources.

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Police Scotland Destroying the Family Unit


Given the types of data and information being shared via the iVPD then the ICO staff visiting the Edinburgh ‘Concern Hub’ on 6 February 2019 were knowingly aware that Police Scotland should have been recording both the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) Article 6 and the Article 9 lawful basis for the data sharing that was occurring both to and from the iVPD. This is not limited to Police
Scotland, this applies to every agency and third sector/non-government agency.


Furthermore, the ICO had by this time seen the 12 October 2018 v1.02 Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) for the iVPD and knew that consent was the lawful basis for the sharing of special category (SC) and criminal offence (CO) data.


The ICO were witness to Police Scotland’s standard operating procedure (SOP) for data entry and saw that Police Scotland operate a clandestine “guilty until proven innocent” process where individuals are assigned to be “victims” and “perpetrators” in the complete absence of any due process, this unqualified data is then shared with a round table collaborate that work together, within a multi-agency context, to collectively exploit information sharing despite domestic law and more importantly sentient knowledge of the breaching of international law which overrides all domestic law.

In short Police Scotland and all other agencies, harvest unsubstantiated data and record, process and transmit allegations of criminality, perceived vulnerability and create a fraudulent and unfounded narrative on the individual and family unit to suit the current Scottish governmental key actions for delivery of policy objectives that are in contrary to that which Scottish Government claim that they are striving for “a justice system that is up-to-date, fair and respects the rights and diverse needs of users” and in the absence of any judicial court verdicts which lawfully substantiate whether an allegation or subjective opinion does indeed prove guilt and accuracy of the allegations or alleged narrative, and in instances where the individual who in law has the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty is exonerated, found guiltless and cleared of all allegations in a court of law, is being completely disregarded and the right to data rectification is being denied.

The fictitious narrative is being peddled as a financial instrument through all agencies to ensure that local council and agency delivery targets are met at any cost to the service user with the full knowledge of the complicit consanguinity of service providers acting for the Scottish Government to actively interfere with Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Right to respect for private and family life

1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The ICO know information pertaining to allegations of criminality is regarded as criminal offence data and requires the strictest of all conditions for processing.

Having first-hand knowledge of Police Scotland’s standard operating procedures for data entry the ICO and are fully cognisant that no one in their right mind would consent to be labelled as “perpetrator” of a crime and subsequently consent to have their data processed on the iVPD/VPD and that Police Scotland, Social Services, Education, NHS Services and all other agencies are breaching DPA2018 the GDPR UK by routinely processing SC and CO data in the absence of the correct recorded lawful basis being consent.

Instead, Public Task is being recorded custom and practice prior to the new DPA act and Post DPA 2018 as the lawful basis where consent is the legislative lawful basis and is clearly not being obtained by Police Scotland and all other multi agencies.

Named Person Violations – Supreme Court Ruling.

Maureen Falconer of the ICO in Edinburgh sat on John Swinney’s alleged “Child Trafficking – Named Person Bill” titled “The Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014” GIRFEC panel from the inception of bring this act into force to ensure state violation and decimation of the family unit, creating policy and legislation for all agencies to apply and have caused thousands of families to be destroyed, and continue to do so, through the public task sharing of fraudulent VPD’s as the ICO and Scottish Government have authorised Police Scotland and all other agencies including third party agencies and non-government departments to rely upon the foolishness of fraudulent VPD reports in the form of MARAC’s, IRD’s, Child protection meetings etc. to destroy the family unit.

The ICO and Scottish Government instructions have led to the Scottish Government and every service provider being responsible and accountable for every loss, harm and injury to each ‘victim’ by breaching a Supreme Court Ruling – The Christian institute v The Lord Advocate and The Scottish Ministers:

Supreme Court Summary

It was found that the NPS breaches Article 8 ECHR rights.

This is both (a) on the broad basis that compulsory appointment of a named person without parental consent amounts to a breach of the parents’ Article 8 rights, and (b) on the narrow basis that the information sharing provisions under Part 4 amount to breaches of parents’ and C&YP’s Article 8 rights [67-68]. The Community Law Advice Network, as intervener, also challenged the information sharing provisions on the basis that they impose too low a threshold for the disclosure of confidential information and amount to an infringement of the Article 8 rights of C&YP. This meant that there was more focus on Article 8 in the appeal before this Court than there had been before the Court of Session below [69].


In the context of the 2014 Act, the interests protected by Article 8 include both family life [71-74] and privacy [75-77], and the operation of the information sharing provisions of Part 4 will result in interferences with those interests [78].

In accordance with the law In order for that interference to be “in accordance with the law” (for the purposes of Article 8(2)), the measures must not only have some basis in domestic law but also be accessible to the person(s) concerned and foreseeable as to their effects. This means rules must be formulated with sufficient precision to give legal protection against arbitrariness [79-81].


In assessing the legality of Part 4, regard must be had to the Guidance [82]. As is clear from the Court’s findings on the Reserved Matters Challenge, there are difficulties in accessing the relevant rules for information sharing.


An information holder would need to read together and cross refer between Part 4, the DPA and the Directive in order to work out the priority of their provisions. Of even greater concern is the lack of safeguards which would enable the proportionality of any interference with Article 8 to be adequately examined [83-84].

For example, information, including confidential information concerning a child or young person’s state of health (e.g. as to contraception, pregnancy or sexually transmitted disease), could be disclosed to a wide range of authorities without
either the child or young person or their parents being aware of the interference with their Article 8 rights, and in circumstances in which there was no objectively compelling reason for the failure to inform them.

Accordingly, as currently drafted, the information sharing sections of Part 4 and the Guidance do not satisfy the requirement of being “in accordance with the law” [85].

Proportionality

In assessing whether the operation of Part 4 would give rise to interferences with Article 8 which are disproportionate having regard to the legitimate aim pursued, it is necessary to distinguish between the 2014 Act and its operation in individual cases [86-88].

Focusing on the proportionality of the legislation itself, Part 4 undoubtedly pursues legitimate policy aims and is clearly rationally connected to those aims [91-92].

Allowing the legislature, the appropriate margin of discretion, Part 4 is also a reasonable measure for the legislature to impose in order to achieve those legitimate aims. It is for this reason that the appellants’ broad challenge cannot succeed.

If a named person could be appointed only with parental consent, the scope for early intervention would be diminished [93]. However, the operation of Part 4 may well give rise to disproportionate interferences in particular cases:

• First, there is a risk that parents will be given the impression that they must accept advice in relation to the services offered by a named person in the exercise of the named person functions, and that their failure to cooperate would be taken as evidence of risk of harm. Care should therefore be taken to emphasise the voluntary nature of the advice, information, support and help offered by the named person [94-95].

• Secondly, the information holder will have to address difficult questions of proportionality in relation to the disclosure of confidential information with the help of only the Guidance, which is limited, and the Part 4 criteria, which set too
low a threshold for overriding duties of confidentiality [96-100].


There is therefore a need for clear guidance to information holders as to how to assess proportionality when considering whether information should be shared [101].

Currently the Scottish Government and all sister agencies are participating in breaching including but not limited to The Supreme Court Ruling and additionally Article 5. 6 and 8 of the Human Right Act notwithstanding DPA2018 and GDPR UK on a national basis, this is an act of the state who are in contravention of their own domestic law which essentially, they have no power to legislate under reserved powers to the UK Government, data protection is a reserved power.

But more blatantly the inalienable rights under the international covenant for civil and political rights, of which human rights are a subsection off are entirely dismissed.

I am well aware that that the ICO had previously told Police Scotland and all attendees at the COSLA Presentation to use implied powers of legislation, to share data as a work around to obtaining ‘consent’ but this was after the event, the New DPA2018 and GDPR, City of Edinburgh Council** see upload of Email from City of Edinburgh were told by the ICO office to carry on regardless so to speak, after the introduction of DPA 2018 even before the COSLA presentation it was custom and practice to take no cognisance of international law such as ICCPR a sub section of which is human rights, which natural men and women entrusted to administer service providers break every single day.

It has been noted that the Chief Constable of The Police Service of Scotland did state that consent was the lawful basis for data sharing, which is actually still is, but that is another conversation.

What is significant is that Maureen Falconer can tell service providers to the government to use implied powers in legislation to share personal data, however if we swing over the Interpretation Act. You will find that there is no jurisdiction over International Law ICCPR (sub section of which is Human Rights), therefore it is the agent of the principal legal fiction that will be held fully accountable.

Ultimately every forged lien and report statement or anything on any records management systems that is inaccurate is the data controller’s responsibility,

ICO Meeting with Police Scotland 14th February 2019

Please see FOI Response

PERSPECTIVES, POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS: INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN A MULTI-AGENCY CONTEXT WORKSHOP: 15 July 2019

Police Scotland VPD Database: ICO: Scottish Government: Local Authorities

Note: After the inception of DPA2018 and GDPR UK

“Following the workshop, ACC Gillian MacDonald contacted third sector
partners to advise them of the intention of Police Scotland to move to a ‘Public
Task’ based approach to information sharing with non-statutory partners,
under certain circumstances. Police Scotland also asked for the wider
stakeholder views of their third sector partners, prior to implementing the
proposed change in policy.”

“ICO update
• Provided an overview of the law on data protection, including the 6 principles
and lawful bases for processing.
• Explained that Article 5 of GDPR provides the building blocks for data
protection – but it is not just about GDPR, there is also the Data Protection
Act 2018.
• Provided an update on the draft ICO Data Sharing Code of Practice.
Discussed person centred data sharing, including things to be considered
when making a judgement call and upholding individual rights.”

The Role of the VPD Administrator Police Scotland

Who makes a judgement call in applying public task for data sharing against upholding individual rights.

The Guise of the Domestic Abuse Scotland 2018 Act.

A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), released under FOISA 2002, has identified that Police Scotland have not confirmed that “multi-agency working” is compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018/General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). Information in the public domain identifies that only Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) meetings have the required Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) in place that define the legality of the information sharing. A multi-agency meeting for an Inter-agency Referral Discussion (IRD) or
Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) level has no legal personality and are not a legal entity.


Additionally the Scottish Government would appear to have no record of the Police Scotland DPIA for multi-agency working that was signed off by both ACC Gillian MacDonald and Police Scotland Information Governance despite the fact that the Scottish Government fund the MARAC Development Programme (MDP) and Data Protection law compliance is a requirement of the funding of SafeLives.

Detective Chief Superintendent Samantha McCluskey of Police Scotland and Anne Marie Hicks (Domestic Abuse Prosecutor) of the COPFS have appeared in a YouTube video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kMKXFHrQvIY Timestamp Approximately 37:00 mins where they have acknowledged that allegations of criminality [arguably Criminal Offence (CO) data as defined by Part 3 the Data Protection Act 2018 and therefore “sensitive” data] are passed from the “Advocacy Service” for example Woman’s Aid, SafeLives, DASAT imbedded into Local Authority Council West Lothian Council et al to Police Scotland by a password protected “electronic portal” and Police Scotland then “sanitize” this data to hide the identity of the individual providing Police Scotland with this “intelligence”. These actions inevitably lead to a Data Subject losing their Right to Rectification under the GDPR are leading to miscarriages of justice as Police Scotland are destroying exculpatory evidence.

Vexatious and Malicious reports and false allegations are being unlawfully shared to create a narrative on an individual target THE PERPETRATOR by the VICTIM (the perpetrator of malicious falsehoods for personal or corporate gain) by all Service providers, populating Police and Social Work intelligence databases with
unsubstantiated claims against an individual which results in a false charge including conviction.

Social Work have stated in an FOI that it is their responsibility to corroborate information received from Police at an inter-agency discussion regardless of whether it is true or not, they must gather information from various sources to corroborate the information supplied by Police Scotland I reiterate “to Corroborate” this uncorroborated and unsubstantiated information in formal court reporting, and if they can’t corroborate the information they simply created the desired narrative in order to do so.

These reports are then considered factual and presented to the court as such, leading to children being taken from one parent and in many cases both parents when the Scottish Children’s Reporter gets involved.

IS the alleged ‘professional’ Public Servant your friend?

Is the School teacher your friend?

Is the Police Constable your friend?

Is the ICO your friend?

Absolutely NOT:

Their remit is to make merchandise out of you, your children, your family at any cost to you and your family to ensure they received maximum income from your harm and distress.

Samantha Kerr